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	<title>Comments for AppSec Street Fighter - SANS Institute</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/comments/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter</link>
	<description>The Application Security Street Fighter Blog</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 16 Mar 2010 17:01:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>Comment on Following a Trail of Breadcrumbs – A Design Flaw in Yahoo! Mail by Khash Kiani</title>
		<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/02/following-a-trail-of-breadcrumbs-%e2%80%93-a-design-flaw-in-yahoo-mail/comment-page-1/#comment-6021</link>
		<dc:creator>Khash Kiani</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Mar 2010 17:01:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/?p=4096#comment-6021</guid>
		<description>Hey Peter - Yes, the target I called Jennifer for this exercise and the correspondence with her were all real!

I think it&#039;s safe to assume that nobody is immune to social engineering attacks hundred percent of the time, even attacks that may seem awfully plain or even silly to most of us. We all get tired, pressed for time, and take mental shortcuts at times, and that’s when we’re vulnerable.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hey Peter &#8211; Yes, the target I called Jennifer for this exercise and the correspondence with her were all real!</p>
<p>I think it&#8217;s safe to assume that nobody is immune to social engineering attacks hundred percent of the time, even attacks that may seem awfully plain or even silly to most of us. We all get tired, pressed for time, and take mental shortcuts at times, and that’s when we’re vulnerable.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Following a Trail of Breadcrumbs – A Design Flaw in Yahoo! Mail by Peter</title>
		<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/02/following-a-trail-of-breadcrumbs-%e2%80%93-a-design-flaw-in-yahoo-mail/comment-page-1/#comment-6016</link>
		<dc:creator>Peter</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 14 Mar 2010 21:44:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/?p=4096#comment-6016</guid>
		<description>One of the better security write-ups I&#039;ve read in a while. Great post, SANS!  It is a good reminder to those in the security industry that not all hacks need to be overly complex.  I, too, noticed this flaw while ago but never considered all the real threats until now. A very holistic article covering these important problems and ways to exploit them to fully owning the targets.  

Was the last example with Jennifer real? Brilliant! How do you find a target this easy!?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One of the better security write-ups I&#8217;ve read in a while. Great post, SANS!  It is a good reminder to those in the security industry that not all hacks need to be overly complex.  I, too, noticed this flaw while ago but never considered all the real threats until now. A very holistic article covering these important problems and ways to exploit them to fully owning the targets.  </p>
<p>Was the last example with Jennifer real? Brilliant! How do you find a target this easy!?</p>
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		<title>Comment on Top 25 Series &#8211; Rank 13 &#8211; PHP File Inclusion by Michael</title>
		<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/11/top-25-series-rank-13-php-file-inclusion/comment-page-1/#comment-5996</link>
		<dc:creator>Michael</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Mar 2010 18:11:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/?p=4501#comment-5996</guid>
		<description>A couple good ways to mitigate this type of issue:

Block any directory traversal (best method):
$file = basename($_GET[&#039;blah&#039;]);

--

Allow subdirectory only traversal, but block parent directory access (alternative, less secure):
$file = preg_replace(&#039;/\.+/&#039;,&#039;.&#039;,$_GET[&#039;blah&#039;]);

You can then do something like: include($path_to_root_dir . $file) and block any nasty directory traversal issues yet allow subdirs. Just make sure to specifiy the path, or you can still get root level access.

Also, don&#039;t forget to validate that the file actually exists and is not a directory, or you might find yourself listing out directory entries on *nix.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A couple good ways to mitigate this type of issue:</p>
<p>Block any directory traversal (best method):<br />
$file = basename($_GET['blah']);</p>
<p>&#8211;</p>
<p>Allow subdirectory only traversal, but block parent directory access (alternative, less secure):<br />
$file = preg_replace(&#8216;/\.+/&#8217;,&#8217;.&#8217;,$_GET['blah']);</p>
<p>You can then do something like: include($path_to_root_dir . $file) and block any nasty directory traversal issues yet allow subdirs. Just make sure to specifiy the path, or you can still get root level access.</p>
<p>Also, don&#8217;t forget to validate that the file actually exists and is not a directory, or you might find yourself listing out directory entries on *nix.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Top 25 Series – Rank 3 – Classic Buffer Overflow by Top 25 Series &#8211; Rank 12 &#8211; Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value</title>
		<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/02/top-25-series-%e2%80%93-rank-3-%e2%80%93-classic-buffer-overflow/comment-page-1/#comment-5991</link>
		<dc:creator>Top 25 Series &#8211; Rank 12 &#8211; Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Mar 2010 03:24:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/?p=4251#comment-5991</guid>
		<description>[...] Access with Incorrect Length Value (CWE-805) is in close relationship with Classic buffer overflow (CWE-120). Class buffer overflow is caused by copying buffer without checking for length. Buffer [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Access with Incorrect Length Value (CWE-805) is in close relationship with Classic buffer overflow (CWE-120). Class buffer overflow is caused by copying buffer without checking for length. Buffer [...]</p>
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		<title>Comment on Top 25 Series &#8211; Rank 11 &#8211; Hardcoded Credentials by Nathan Christiansen</title>
		<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/10/top-25-series-rank-11-hardcoded-credentials/comment-page-1/#comment-5986</link>
		<dc:creator>Nathan Christiansen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Mar 2010 18:37:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/?p=4456#comment-5986</guid>
		<description>We completely avoid hard-coded credentials for admin purposes.

We make the admin functions of our website only accessible to a small group inside the company and authenticate them via our company&#039;s internal Active Directory server through an application proxy which we program.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>We completely avoid hard-coded credentials for admin purposes.</p>
<p>We make the admin functions of our website only accessible to a small group inside the company and authenticate them via our company&#8217;s internal Active Directory server through an application proxy which we program.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Following a Trail of Breadcrumbs – A Design Flaw in Yahoo! Mail by Anon</title>
		<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/02/following-a-trail-of-breadcrumbs-%e2%80%93-a-design-flaw-in-yahoo-mail/comment-page-1/#comment-5976</link>
		<dc:creator>Anon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Mar 2010 01:00:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/?p=4096#comment-5976</guid>
		<description>Now I know exactly how my yahoo account keeps getting compromised even after changing my password and secret questions.  Congratulations! This is a very good post and the nice little story behind it compliments the technical issues very well.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Now I know exactly how my yahoo account keeps getting compromised even after changing my password and secret questions.  Congratulations! This is a very good post and the nice little story behind it compliments the technical issues very well.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Following a Trail of Breadcrumbs – A Design Flaw in Yahoo! Mail by Khash Kiani</title>
		<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/02/following-a-trail-of-breadcrumbs-%e2%80%93-a-design-flaw-in-yahoo-mail/comment-page-1/#comment-5971</link>
		<dc:creator>Khash Kiani</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Mar 2010 00:16:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/?p=4096#comment-5971</guid>
		<description>JB, 
No specific reason for masking the city names.

JW,
Regarding your question about &quot;all the reasons for this suspect implementation:  I was just discussing this with a friend the other day and we believe the reasons are twofold:  Firstly, giving the victim the ability to gain access to her compromised account via the original secret questions. And secondly, perhaps more importantly, reducing customer service costs associated with this “self service” account recovery. 

Whatever the reasons for this implementation, if a Security Threat Assessment is conducted and ALL the risks weighted, these issues would be addressed.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>JB,<br />
No specific reason for masking the city names.</p>
<p>JW,<br />
Regarding your question about &#8220;all the reasons for this suspect implementation:  I was just discussing this with a friend the other day and we believe the reasons are twofold:  Firstly, giving the victim the ability to gain access to her compromised account via the original secret questions. And secondly, perhaps more importantly, reducing customer service costs associated with this “self service” account recovery. </p>
<p>Whatever the reasons for this implementation, if a Security Threat Assessment is conducted and ALL the risks weighted, these issues would be addressed.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Following a Trail of Breadcrumbs – A Design Flaw in Yahoo! Mail by TheLightCosine</title>
		<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/02/following-a-trail-of-breadcrumbs-%e2%80%93-a-design-flaw-in-yahoo-mail/comment-page-1/#comment-5966</link>
		<dc:creator>TheLightCosine</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Mar 2010 20:35:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/?p=4096#comment-5966</guid>
		<description>A very nice writeup, well written and fun to read. Sad that the same old tricks never die.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A very nice writeup, well written and fun to read. Sad that the same old tricks never die.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Top 25 Series – Rank 3 – Classic Buffer Overflow by TheLightCosine</title>
		<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/02/top-25-series-%e2%80%93-rank-3-%e2%80%93-classic-buffer-overflow/comment-page-1/#comment-5961</link>
		<dc:creator>TheLightCosine</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Mar 2010 20:19:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/?p=4251#comment-5961</guid>
		<description>DEP and ASLR are fast becoming marginalised as more and more methods are found to bypass these protections, such as the JIT Spray attack or the  return-to-libc attack. Buffer overflows remain as dangerous as ever.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>DEP and ASLR are fast becoming marginalised as more and more methods are found to bypass these protections, such as the JIT Spray attack or the  return-to-libc attack. Buffer overflows remain as dangerous as ever.</p>
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		<title>Comment on Top 25 Series – Rank 4 – Cross Site Request Forgery by TheLightCosine</title>
		<link>http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/2010/03/03/top-25-series-%e2%80%93-rank-4-%e2%80%93-cross-site-request-forgery/comment-page-1/#comment-5956</link>
		<dc:creator>TheLightCosine</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Mar 2010 20:15:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.sans.org/appsecstreetfighter/?p=4376#comment-5956</guid>
		<description>As someone who does Web Application tests for a living, I can tell you CSRF has got to be one of the most prevalent vulnerabilities I see. It may not seem like a big deal, but coupled with other vulnerabilities it can turn into a serious problem quickly. It is not very hard or resource intensive to implement proper CSRF tokens. I feel there is little excuse in this day to not include them as a matter of course in any user submitted action.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As someone who does Web Application tests for a living, I can tell you CSRF has got to be one of the most prevalent vulnerabilities I see. It may not seem like a big deal, but coupled with other vulnerabilities it can turn into a serious problem quickly. It is not very hard or resource intensive to implement proper CSRF tokens. I feel there is little excuse in this day to not include them as a matter of course in any user submitted action.</p>
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